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ABSTRACT This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour
unions. An oligopoly model is developed in which identical firms locate in a host country
in order to export to a foreign country. These firms are unionized and compete with
foreign firms on the foreign market. We consider the incentives for social dumping via
restrictive labour legislation, which we assume can be used by the host country
government to affect the bargaining power of unions. We ask whether it is in the interest
of the importing foreign country for the host country to relax or to tighten labour laws.
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Introduction
A fundamental issue in the debate surrounding globalization concerns the
extent to which inter-country differences in labour standards distort the
international allocation of resources. In advanced industrial economies
there is a fear that – by making use of cheap labour and lax labour market
regulations – developing countries may be able to enjoy unfair advantages
over competitors, not only in international trade but also in their ability to
attract and/or retain investment. Given the alleged importance of labour
costs in determining the location choice of multinational firms (MNEs),
labour interests in industrial countries warn of the dangers of a race-to-the-
bottom in social standards as governments may be tempted to actively relax
regulatory frameworks to compete for jobs. Indeed, calls for a formal
incorporation of the issue of labour standards into WTO trade liberalization
negotiations have systematically been met by resistance by developing
countries, who perceive international pressures for the establishment of
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monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to their labour practices as forms
of hidden protectionism.1
The aim of this paper is to illuminate issues raised within this debate by
examining the implications of the use of labour market legislation on (i) a
(developing) country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and
(ii) on the conflict of interest that might arise between a country that hosts
export-oriented FDI and an importing country with respect to levels of
labour market regulation.
Cost and labour market flexibility considerations rank high amongst the
determinants of the location decisions of internationally mobile firms and
are often entwined with concerns about market access, i.e. with the desire to
gain access to another market that may otherwise be difficult to penetrate.
For instance, US and Japanese firms wishing to gain access to European
Union markets will often try to locate in the lower wage periphery or in the
flexible labour markets of the UK and Ireland and use them as an export
base to avoid the common external tariffs imposed by the European Union.
Similarly, European firms may locate in Mexico to export to the US. Often,
in situations such as this, the main objective of FDI is not to serve the host
country’s market, and the vast bulk of the multinationals’ output is exported
to a foreign market.2
In this paper we shall be concerned with FDI that occurs for both the
labour cost and the market access reasons, and develop a framework that
enables us to capture the conflict of interest that emerges between
industrialized and developing countries when firms in the former compete –
for their own domestic market – with MNEs located in countries where
labour costs are lower. In such a situation, incentives may arise in the
industrialized country to bring accusations of social dumping against the
country that hosts the MNEs if, in the latter, labour standards are lower
than in the former. With respect to labour standards, we shall concentrate
on the first ILO core Labour Standard, namely freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.3 Specifically,
we shall assume that governments can affect the bargaining power of the
unions through legislation and we shall link weak labour standards to weak
bargaining power of unions.
We set up an oligopoly model of ‘export-platform’ FDI in which identical
multinational firms locate in a host country (which can be thought of as an
LDC) in order to export to the market of a foreign industrial economy
where they face competition from indigenous firms. The multinationals,
owned by residents of a third country, repatriate all their profits and, once
located in the host country, face unionized labour markets. Unionization
generates a trade-off for the host country’s government: on the one hand
unions represent a means to extract rents from foreign multinationals; on
the other, to the extent that it results in higher firms’ costs, unionization may
discourage inward FDI. In an attempt to attract investment, the host
country government may thus have an incentive to limit unions’ power.
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Governments’ engagement in social dumping may however be perceived as
unfair by foreign competitors, particularly where concerns about employ-
ment exist.
We consider the host country’s government’s incentives for restricting
unions’ power and engaging in social dumping motivated by a desire to
attract FDI. To this end, we assume that the host country government has
the power to affect the bargaining power of the unions through legislation.
We also assume that unemployment exists in both countries and ask
whether it is in the interest of the importing country for the host country to
relax or to tighten labour laws.
The literature on labour standards and international trade does not
normally treat labour standards as policy variables, even when – as for
example in Casella (1996) – they are endogenously determined.4 Similarly,
those contributions that explore the relationship between labour market
institutions and FDI typically ignore the possibility of the government’s
(strategic) use of union legislation.5 As a notable exception, Leahy &
Montagna (2000b) analyse a host country government’s incentives to
legalise unions when MNEs benefit from dynamic effects.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section sets up the basic
model. In the section after, we examine the incentives faced by the host
country to tighten union legislation and engage in some form of social
dumping. We also analyse the implications of such policies for the foreign
importing country, which is concerned with both unemployment and with
consumer surplus. In the fourth section, we consider an extension of the
model. The fifth section concludes the paper.
The Model
We develop a partial equilibrium oligopoly model of ‘export-platform’ FDI
that consists of three countries that we refer to as the ‘host’, ‘importing’ and
‘third’ country respectively. Multinationals locate in the host country and
use it exclusively as an export base to serve the importing country market.6
We assume that exports to the latter are only viable once the multinationals
are located in the host country, which can be thought of as a developing
country that enjoys geographical proximity and/or a preferential trading
agreement with the importing country. The importing country, where
indigenous firms also produce the good, can be thought of as a mature
industrial economy characterized by factors such as high labour costs and
rigid labour markets (e.g. strict employment protection laws) that make it an
unattractive location for footloose firms and that make it too costly for its
firms to relocate. We shall therefore assume that (i) MNEs do not locate in
the importing country and (ii) the importing country’s firms do not relocate
to the host country.7 The third country can be thought of as the rest of the
world, from which the MNEs originate. Apart from acting as a source of
FDI, this country plays no other role in the analysis.
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The MNEs are symmetric in every respect and the number of these firms
that set up in the host country is represented by N, which is endogenously
determined. The host country is unionized and each MNE bargains with a
single union over the wage to be paid to the homogeneous labour it
employs. The wage paid by the ith multinational is given by wi and the
quantity it produces is qi. To simplify, we assume labour is the only factor
used in production and we normalize the input requirement of the typical
MNE at unity so that wi is the MNE’s marginal production cost. The MNE
must also incur a (non-labour) fixed location cost F that can be thought of
as encompassing both the plant fixed costs and other fixed opportunity costs
such as the reservation profit level (which will depend on profit
opportunities in the rest of the world).
We assume that a fixed number M of symmetric firms are already located
in the importing country. Each of these firms uses labour as the only input
and has a constant marginal cost denoted by o. To start with, we assume
away importing-country unions as we wish to focus on the role of union
bargaining power in the host country.8 This assumption will be relaxed in
the fourth section. The inverse demand curve in the importing-country
market is given by:
p ¼ a bQ ð1Þ
where p is price, Q is the total quantity produced and a and b are positive
constants. Total output is:
Q ¼
XN
i
qi þ
XM
k
qk ð2Þ
where qi is the output of the typical MNE located in the host country and q

k
is the output of the typical foreign firm located in the importing country.
The rent that a typical MNE obtains from its production in the host country
is given by:
Pi ¼ pi  F ¼ ðp wiÞqi  F ð3Þ
where pi represent the firm’s variable profit. The profits of the kth
importing-country firm are:
pk ¼ ðp oÞqk ð4Þ
The typical union in the host country is assumed to be interested in
maximizing labour rents and has utility function:
ui ¼ wiqi ð5Þ
where we have normalized the non-union wage at zero and where, given the
assumed production technology, output qi is equal to employment in the
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firm. Thus, the wage and the employment in the firm receive equal weight in
the union’s utility function.9
We model the interaction between agents as a three-stage game. In stage
one, entry of MNEs into the host country occurs until the profits of the
entrants are driven to zero. In the second stage, each MNE bargains over
the wage with a union representing its workforce. Finally, the MNEs and
the importing-country firms choose their outputs simultaneously in a
Cournot manner.
The third-stage first-order condition for a typical MNE is given by:
p bqi  wi ¼ 0 ð6Þ
and the first-order condition for a representative importing-country firm is:
p bqk  o ¼ 0 ð7Þ
Combine equations (6) and (7) to give the Cournot – Nash equilibrium:
q ¼ a ðMþ 1ÞwþMo
bðNþMþ 1Þ ;
q ¼ a ðNþ 1ÞoþNw
bðNþMþ 1Þ :
ð8Þ
In stage two, the unions and the MNEs bargain over the wage. We model
this as the outcome of a Nash bargaining process.10 As firms and their
unions bargain over wages simultaneously, they view the wages set by other
firms as fixed. Thus, firm i and union i solve the following problem:
max
wi
BðwiÞ ¼ uai p1ai ; 04a4 1 ð9Þ
where a is the bargaining power of the union, subject to:
qi ¼ a ðNþMÞwi þ ðN 1Þwj þMo
bðNþMþ 1Þ ð10Þ
Equation (10) gives the output of firm i as a function of its own wage and the
wages of all other multinationals, and the importing country’s marginal
cost. This can be interpreted as firm i’s perceived labour demand function.
Given identical MNEs and unions, the solution to the bargaining process
implies the symmetric wage:
w ¼ ðaþMoÞg
NþMþ ðMþ 1Þg ; ð11Þ
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where g ¼ a/(27a). The parameter g, which lies between zero and one, is a
measure of the relative bargaining power of unions. In stage two the number
of firms is given, and w is increasing in g.
In stage one, the MNEs enter the host country until the profits of the
firms that choose to locate there are equal to the reservation profit that they
would obtain elsewhere in the world. Hence the entry condition for the
MNEs is given by pi7F¼ 0. Make use of equation (6), the first-order
condition for the typical MNE, into the latter, to get bq2¼F. Hence, the
equilibrium MNE output per firm is:
q ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
F=b
p
ð12Þ
It is clear from equation (12) that the output of a multinational that locates
in the host-country is independent of the bargaining power of unions.
However, bargaining power will affect the number of MNEs that eventually
locate. This is captured by the following derivative11
dN
dg
¼ ðNþMÞðNþMþ 1ÞðMþ 1ÞðNþMÞ2  ðMþ 1Þg < 0; ð13Þ
which implies that an increase in the bargaining power of unions reduces the
number of MNEs entering the country.
Welfare
We now turn to the welfare analysis. In particular, we wish to examine how
varying labour standards, in the form of changes in the degree of union
power, affect the welfare of both the host and the importing countries.
Changes in g can be thought of as resulting from government actions, such
as labour market reforms.
It will be informative to derive the optimal value of the bargaining power
parameter, as if chosen by the government before the FDI decisions are
made. Given that one of our objectives is to determine whether a conflict of
interest might arise between the two countries with respect to labour
standards, we shall determine the optimal g both from the point of view of
the host country and from the point of view of the importing country. Note,
however, that we shall not limit the analysis to the optimal values of g, i.e.
we shall not always choose to model governments as players in a four-stage
game. To do so would be both unrealistic – because it would imply that the
unions’ bargaining power is completely under the control of the policy
authorities – and unnecessarily restrictive, because it would prevent us from
highlighting the existence of either conflict or congruence of interest between
the host and importing countries’ governments over the whole range of this
parameter.
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Given that the host country exports all its output to the importing
country, its welfare is just total labour rents:
W ¼ Nu ¼ Nwq ð14Þ
whereas in the importing country it is:
W ¼ CSþM p þ doqð Þ; ð15Þ
where CS is the consumer surplus enjoyed in the importing country. The
weight 04d4 1 reflects the importance that the government attaches to
employment. For instance, if d ¼ 1, there is unemployment in the importing
country and the entire cost of production oq* is assumed to be the income
of workers who would remain unemployed otherwise. Thus, in general, the
social opportunity cost of output is (17d)oq*. Only if d¼ 0, does o
represent the true marginal opportunity cost of output in the economy. This
is more likely to be the case if there is a tight labour market.
We proceed by totally differentiating the host country’s welfare function
to get:
dW ¼ qðwdNþNdwÞ: ð16Þ
As the equilibrium output per firm q is constant, from equation (12),
changes in the level of welfare can only occur if the wage or the number of
MNEs (i.e. the host country market structure) change. Make use of the fact
that, from combining equations (8) and (11), w¼ g bq (NþMþ 1)/(NþM)
so as to write:
dw
dg
¼ bqðNþMÞ ðNþMþ 1Þ 
g
ðNþMÞ
dN
dg
 
: ð17Þ
From equation (17), it is clear that an increase in g will raise the wage in two
ways: the first term in square brackets captures the direct effect; the second
term captures the indirect effect that goes through a reduction of the
equilibrium number of firms. The fall in N increases each MNE’s monopoly
power in the product market and thus increases the potential for unions’
rent extraction. Stronger union bargaining power raises the wage for a given
number of MNEs. However, it will also work to deter investment, reducing
the number of firms and hence employment in the high wage MNE sector.
The equilibrium number of host country firms N (g) reaches a maximum at
N0¼N (0) and a minimum at N1¼N (1).12
To find the optimal level of g from the point of view of the host country,
proceed by making use of equation (17) in (16) to obtain:
dW
dg
¼ bq2 ðNþMþ 1ÞðNþMÞ g
N
Mþ 1
 
dN
dg
: ð18Þ
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It is straightforward to show that the host-country welfare is concave in g.
At g close to zero the right-hand side of equation (18) is positive, hence the
optimal level of g is positive: it is not optimal to reduce the union bargaining
power to zero. Moreover, despite the concavity of W (g), there may not be
an interior solution. To see this, note that at g equal to unity, the right-hand
side of (18) is positive if, at that level of bargaining power, the expression in
square brackets is negative.
Proposition 1
The optimal level of the bargaining power parameter g in the host country
(i) is given by:
go ¼ min 1; NðNþMÞðMþ 1ÞðNþMþ 1Þ
 
ð19Þ
and
(ii) is less than unity iff: M2 þ 2Mþ 1þN1 N21 > 0.
An interior solution (i.e. one in which go lies between zero and unity)
implies that at g¼ 1, dW/dg5 0. Part (ii) of the proposition follows from
equation (18) and the fact that dN/dg is negative. To study the factors
that make an interior solution more or less likely we could consider
the reduced form expression for N1, which is unfortunately very
complicated and hence not readily interpretable. Note, however, that since
N04N1, M2 þ 2Mþ 1þN0 N20 > 0 is a sufficient condition for
M2 þ 2Mþ 1þN1 N21 > 0 and hence for an interior solution. Making
use of N0¼T – (Mþ 1) (where T is defined in Note 12) we then find that
T (2Mþ 3) –T2 – (Mþ 1)5 0 is a sufficient condition for go5 1. HoldingM
constant, the left-hand-side of this inequality is falling in T. Hence, go5 1 is
more likely to hold the smaller is T and thus the higher is F and the lower is
o (see Note 12). A higher level ofM usually works towards a larger value of
T (2Mþ 3) –T2 – (Mþ 1) and thus makes it more likely that go5 1. The
host country government will have an incentive to restrict the bargaining
power of its unions if it is above its optimal level, that is if g4 go (of course
this is only possible if go5 1, as the value of g never exceeds unity). The more
competitive is the importing country’s industry relative to that in the host
country – that is the larger isM, the lower is o, and the larger is F (that tends
to reduce N) – the more likely the host-country government will want to turn
to restrictive legislation aimed at reducing the bargaining power of its
unions to improve the competitiveness of the local industry.
Before proceeding, it is interesting to note that from the host country
perspective there are two externalities arising from the wage bargaining of
individual unions. First, when maximizing its objective function, the
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individual union does not internalise the beneficial effect that a higher wage
has on the utility of the other unions: an increase in the wage faced by its
firm raises the other firms’ relative efficiency and, thus, the rent extraction
ability of the other unions. This externality tends to increase the optimal g.
The second externality, which works towards a reduction in the optimal g,
arises from the fact that a higher wage reduces the number of firms that
locate in the host country. This arises because bargaining takes place after
the entry decision of the MNEs and, as a result, unions do not internalize
the effects of the wage on the number of firms. As a result, the host
government has in incentive to reduce union power in order to deal with the
‘time consistency’ problem, which stems from the sequence of the game, with
the MNEs having to make their location decision before the wage
bargaining process.
In our model the unions are firm specific. It straightforward to see,
however, that a centralized wage process with one union covering the entire
sector would result in higher negotiated wages for a given bargaining power.
This is because the union would take account of the positive effect of higher
wages in one firm on the employment levels (and rents available) in the other
firms. As in the case considered here, however, the centralized union would
remain unable to overcome the time consistency problem as wages would
still be set after firms choose to locate.
We now turn to the effect of host-country union bargaining power on
the welfare of the importing country. It is helpful first to analyse how the
different components of the importing country’s welfare are affected by
the level of labour standards in the host country. To this end, it proves
useful to find p and q* as functions of q:
p ¼ aþMoNbq
Mþ 1 ;
q ¼ a oNbq
bðMþ 1Þ :
ð20Þ
Note that, from equations (4) and (7), profits of the typical import-
competing country firm can be written as p*¼ bq*2 and labour rents are
dMoq*. Thus, from equation (20), both firm and labour rents are decreasing
in N and thus increasing in g. Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is falling
in the price and thus, from equation (20), in g. Therefore, weak unions in the
host (less developed) country are in the interest of consumers in the
importing (developed) country. Consumers in the importing country
(assuming, as we do here, that they are only interested in consumer surplus
and are not moved by ethical considerations) always want lower labour
standards in the host country, while firms and workers prefer strong unions
in the host country. The welfare function is a composite of these two
opposing interests.
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More formally, totally differentiate equation (15) making use of the fact
that: d (CS)¼ –Qdp to get:
dW ¼ QdpþM p ð1 dÞoð Þdq þ qdp½  ð21Þ
It is straightforward to rewrite this as:
dW ¼ NqdpþM p ð1 dÞoð Þdq ð22Þ
Recalling thatM is exogenous and that, from equation (12), q is determined
by F/b (which is a constant), it is clear that both p and q* depend on g only
through changes in N. It is then possible to use equation (20) and its
derivatives in equation (22) to get:
dW
dg
¼  q
Mþ 1 M p ð1 dÞoð Þ  bNq½ 
dN
dg
ð23Þ
which has the same sign as [M(p7 (17 d)o)7 bNq]. Clearly, this is more
likely to be positive the larger are (p7o) and d and the smaller is Nq. The
larger is (p7o), the larger is the increase in the importing-country’s total
profits that stems from an expansion of the output of its firms. The
growth in the overall market share held by the importing-country firms is
a by-product of a fall in production in the host country that results from
the stronger union power and consequent loss of host-country competi-
tiveness. The bigger is d, (i) the larger are labour rents in the importing
country, and (ii) the more likely will an increase in the bargaining power
of unions in the host country (with a consequent fall in its production)
benefit the importing country. The larger is Nq, that is the higher is the
level of imports from the host country, the less likely that an increase in g
will raise importing-country welfare, and the less likely it is that the
importing country will oppose low labour standards in the host country.
This is because the larger are imports the more consumers in the
importing country suffer in higher prices as a result of the increase in
labour costs in the host country. The term in square bracket in equation
(23) can also be rewritten as b(Mq*7Nq)þMdo. It is then clear that the
derivative is positive if the market share of the importing country exceeds
that of the host country.
It can be shown that W*(g) is convex and hence there is a level of
bargaining power that minimizes importing-country welfare.13 To find the
minimum, make use of the fact that p¼wþ bq from the first-order condition
of a typical MNE, and the fact that equilibrium wage can be rewritten as
w¼ g bq (NþMþ 1) / (NþM), to write p¼wþ bq¼ bq[gþ (1þ g)(NþM)]/
(NþM). Use this to eliminate p in equation (23). It is then straightforward
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to obtain the level of union strength (g*min) that gives the lowest level of
welfare from the importing country’s perspective:
gmin ¼
0 if K4 0
K if 0 < K4 1;
1 if K5 1
8<
: ð24Þ
where K ¼ NþMNþMþ1 NMð Þbqþ 1dð ÞMoMbq , and g¼K is the unrestricted mathema-
tical minimum of the function. Of course, g, unlike K, cannot exceed unity
or fall below zero. This is why g*min is not always identical to K. When
g*min¼ 0, then foreign welfare is maximized at g*o¼ 1 (where g*o is the
optimal value of g from the importing country’s point of view), and when
g*min¼ 1 we have g*o¼ 0. If g*min lies strictly between zero and unity, then
g*o could lie at either extreme – zero or unity. The importing country’s
welfare minimizing g is more likely to be zero, and hence g*o is more likely to
be unity, the larger is d, the weight of employment in the foreign welfare
function. From now on, for simplicity, we will set this weight at its
maximum level, i.e. assume d¼ 1.
The following proposition is concerned with the different impacts of
bargaining power on welfare in the host and importing countries.
Specifically, it gives sufficient conditions for a convergence and for a
divergence of interests between the two countries.
Proposition 2
(i) N05M is a sufficient condition for: (1) g
*min¼ 0; (2) g*o¼ 1; and (3)
05 go5 1;
(ii) N14 (1/2)[Mþ (9M2þ 4M)1/2] is a sufficient condition for (1) g*min¼ 1;
(2) g*o¼ 0; and, provided M5 2, (3) go¼ 1.
These two cases, which can be thought of as corresponding to a situation
in which the number of multinationals in the host country is small/large
respectively, are discussed in turn.
In case (i), where N05M, we get a clear divergence of interest between
the host and the foreign importing country. In this case, an accusation of
social dumping is likely to arise, as the importing country would like the
host country unions to have a greater bargaining power than would be
optimal from the point of view of the host country government, that is
go5 g*o. This is because in the importing country the negative effect of social
dumping on profits and labour rents is more important than the positive
effect on its consumers. It can be shown, from Proposition 1, that when
N05M the host government would not want g¼ 1 as this would be too
harmful to the competitiveness of firms located there. It is easy to show that
N05M implies T – (2Mþ 1)5 0 (see Note 12). This inequality is more
likely to hold the smaller is o, the marginal cost of the importing-country
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firms, and the larger is F, the set-up cost of the MNEs; that is, the higher is
the relative cost of choosing the host country as a location.14 An
improvement in outside options for the MNEs will raise F and make it
more likely that the host government will wish to pursue policies that will
bring a charge of social dumping.
In case (ii) of Proposition 2, when N14 (1/2)[Mþ (9M2þ 4M)1/2], the
number of MNEs that can be supported is sufficiently large relative to the
number of the importing country’s firms for K to exceed unity and thus, as
we have explained, for g*o¼ 0. This condition is more likely to hold the
larger is o and the smaller is F. In this case, the relative importance to the
importing country’s government of profit and labour rents is now much
lower than in case (i) above and consumer interests dominate. In this case,
the importing country would not initiate a social dumping complaint since it
is to its advantage that labour standards in the host country be even lower
than it would be optimal for that country to impose.
Unions and Endogenous Wages in the Importing Country
In the interest of tractability, so far we have assumed that unions exist only in
the host country and have treated the wage in the importing country
as exogenous. However, it is plausible to think of the host and the
importing country as representing a developing and an industrial economy
respectively – with the latter arguably being even more likely to be unionized
than the former.
Allowing for unionization in the importing country adds interesting
dimensions to our analysis, not least because unions in industrialized
economies perceive their rent extraction ability as being affected, via both
trade flows and FDI, by the bargaining power of workers (or the lack of it)
in developing countries that produce competing goods.
Analytically, the major implication of allowing for unions in the
importing country is to endogenize marginal costs there. To simplify, we
assume that unions in the industrialized importing country have maximum
bargaining power when setting the wage w*.15 We continue to assume that
labour is the only variable input used in production. In order to allow the
countries to have a different labour productivity, we continue to normalize
the host-country labour requirement at unity, but set the labour requirement
in the importing country at b.
The typical importing country firm will now have a marginal production
cost of ok ¼ wkb, and its profits will be:
pk ¼ ðp okÞqk: ð25Þ
The typical union in the importing country is assumed to be interested in
maximising labour rents and has a utility function:
uk ¼ okqk: ð26Þ
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The union chooses wk (or equivalently ok) to maximise u

k, at the same time
as unions in the host country.
In stage one, the MNEs anticipate wages and enter the host-country until
profits from doing so are driven to zero.
The model with endogenous importing-country wages is much more
complicated algebraically. Hence, we needed to solve the model numerically.
Our simulations indicate that the effect of host-country union bargaining
power on host-country welfare is qualitatively similar to that in the basic
model. In addition, we continue to have dN/dg5 0 (although the exact
expression is now much more complicated algebraically). Simulations show
that a highM and a low N0 continue to work towards an interior optimal g.
Hence, as before, the stronger the competition facing the host-country
(reflected in a high M), the stronger will be the host country government’s
incentive to try to limit the bargaining power of domestic unions.
More interesting is to study how the effects of changes in host country’s
union power on the importing country’s welfare are affected by the presence
of unions in the latter. Modifying the importing country’s welfare to include
unions’ utility:
W ¼ CSþMðp þ uÞ ð27Þ
the effect of g on W* can now be written as:
dW
dg
¼ Mp bNq½  dq

dg
Nqdo
dg
ð28Þ
Compared to the basic model there is an additional negative term, –Nq
(do/dg), on the right-hand side. An increase in bargaining power in the host
country has a negative impact on the importing country’s welfare via an
increase in its wages. A larger g raises w and this allows the unions in the
importing country to raise wages. The higher w* reduces total surplus in the
importing country through an increase in price and a consequent fall in
consumer surplus, and through a fall in profits. Although importing country
unions gain from the increase in bargaining power of unions in their trading
partner, this gain is more than compensated by the fall in consumer surplus
and profits that is due to the higher wages. Thus, perhaps paradoxically,
unions in the importing country and the consequent endogenous wages that
they imply make it less likely that the importing country’s government will
wish to charge the host country with social dumping. An interesting conflict
of interest emerges, however, within the importing country: whilst labour
interests fear social dumping, consumers do not have a strong incentive to
endorse arguments (which may often be couched in ethical terms) in favour
of raising labour standards in developing countries. This analysis is of
course based on the simple additive welfare function in (27) and ignores
possible political economy issues, whereby (for instance) the interest of
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unions and firms may have a stronger impact on the actions of the
government than the interest of consumers has.
Summary of the Results and Conclusions
This paper has shed light on the implications of using labour market
regulation to affect the location decisions of multinationals. The focus of
our analysis was on (1) a (developing) country government’s incentive to try
to affect the bargaining power of unions in an attempt to attract foreign
direct investment and (2) the conflict of interest that might arise between and
within countries with respect to social dumping.
Our results go somewhat against the conventional wisdom in suggesting
that, despite the fact that governments often see them as an impediment to
successful competition in world markets, it is unlikely ever to be optimal for
a (developing) country that tries to attract FDI to drive the power of its
unions to the lowest level possible, even though this would maximize FDI.
Indeed, there are circumstances in which the government may have an
incentive not to restrict the bargaining power of unions, but rather to
encourage it to the full. These results ultimately reflect the trade-off that the
host country government faces between using its unions as a means of
extracting rents from foreign multinationals and the desire to attract foreign
investment to the country. We show that the incentive to try to restrict
unions’ degree of bargaining power will depend on the competitive position
of the host country relative to its trading partner: the higher is the cost of
production in the host country relative to the importing country, the more
likely it is that the host country government would find it optimal to turn to
restrictive union legislation to improve the local industry.
Overall, importing industrial economies will be more likely to oppose low
labour standards in competing developing countries (1) the less exposed to
(or dependent on) imports from the latter they are, and (perhaps
surprisingly) (2) the greater the relative cost competitiveness of their
domestic firms.16 We also found, paradoxically, that unions in the importing
country and the consequent endogenous wages that they imply make it less
likely than the importing country’s government will wish to charge the host
country with social dumping. Social dumping abroad helps discipline wage
demands at home. Of course, this analysis is based on a simple additive
welfare function and, in practice, the interests of unions and firms may have
a stronger impact on the actions of the government than the interests of the
consumers have.
Finally, not only is the rhetoric of the arguments about international
differences in labour standards often suggestive of a divergence of interest
between industrialized and developing countries, but it also betrays a variety
of conflicting attitudes within countries. Our model contributes to our
understanding of these differences. In the absence of ethical and/or political
economy considerations, our findings suggest that a divergence of interest
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will typically emerge in importing countries between consumers, who favour
social dumping, and firms (and their workers) which prefer unions in
competing developing countries to be strong.
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Notes
1 As highlighted by recent reports by the ILO (1997) and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (2004), governments increasingly perceive unions as an obstacle to
successful competition in goods and foreign investment markets and make attempts to
restrict their power and workers’ rights. This has typically led to a widespread drop in union
membership and in a tendency to decentralization in union bargaining (ILO, 1997). Despite
this, however, in many instances unions’ influence is still strong, particularly at the sectoral
level (both in industrialized and developing countries) and many MNEs (e.g. Nike and Gap)
have extended common ‘codes of conduct’ to workers in their LDCs’ operations and
subcontracting relationships (ILO, 1997).
2 See Barry and Bradley (1997) for the Irish case.
3 Compliance to this core labour standard means that governments should not punish workers
who use the threat of strikes to strengthen their bargaining position with employers and that
they should have enforcement mechanisms in place to prevent employers from taking action
against workers who strike. Hence, for instance, legislation that allows employers to hire
permanent replacements for striking workers violates this core labour standard.
4 A notable exception is Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
5 See for instance: Zhao (1995, 1988), Naylor and Santoni (1998), Leahy and Montagna (2000a).
6 This export platform setting is as in Lahiri and Ono (2003).
7 Allowing for these firms to become multinationals and/or relocate to the host country would
not qualitatively alter the welfare results of the paper.
8 Since we allow for the possibility that there is unemployment in the developed country, the
absence of unions should not be taken to imply that the labour market in this country is
more flexible than that in the developing country.
9 Clearly, union utility could take some alternative forms. However, we believe this is the
simplest, least controversial, and the one most commonly used in the literature. It is clear
that if, ceteris paribus, employment in the firm were to receive a higher (lower) weight than
the wage then the negotiated wage would be lower (higher).
10 For simplicity we assume that the conflict payoffs of the firms and unions are zero.
11 Equation (13) is obtained by combining equations (8) and (11), substituting into equation
(12) and then using the implicit function theorem.
12 It can be shown that: N0¼T – (Mþ 1) where T¼ (aþMo)(bF)71/2. Hence, for N5 1, we
need T5Mþ 2.
13 To see this, take the second derivative of the welfare function with respect to g and evaluate it
at the point at which the first derivative is zero. It is easy to check that this is positive.
14 It is worth noting that, other things equal, a larger M does not, per se, make this case more
likely. If the cost competitiveness of the importing country’s firms is relatively low (i.e. o is
large), dN/dM is positive.
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15 An extension that considered a game between the governments in setting bargaining powers
would be possible. However, as we argued earlier, it is probably unrealistic to assume that
the bargaining power of a union is completely under the control of the policy authorities.
16 Clearly, oppositions to social dumping in this model are effectively based on strategic trade
considerations that stem from the imperfectly competitive framework. In a perfectly
competitive model there would be no rent shifting incentive to oppose social dumping,
because of the terms of trade improvement (which may explain the conventional wisdom
amongst economists).
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